diff --git a/l4d2web/routes/auth_routes.py b/l4d2web/routes/auth_routes.py
index ce5d523..e2efc6f 100644
--- a/l4d2web/routes/auth_routes.py
+++ b/l4d2web/routes/auth_routes.py
@@ -12,10 +12,12 @@ _TIMING_DUMMY_DIGEST = hash_password("__timing_dummy__")
 LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_SECONDS = 60.0
 LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT_MAX_ATTEMPTS = 20
 LOGIN_ATTEMPTS_BY_IP: dict[str, list[float]] = {}
+LOGIN_ATTEMPTS_BY_USERNAME: dict[str, list[float]] = {}
 
 
 def reset_login_rate_limits() -> None:
     LOGIN_ATTEMPTS_BY_IP.clear()
+    LOGIN_ATTEMPTS_BY_USERNAME.clear()
 
 
 def is_login_rate_limited(remote_addr: str) -> bool:
@@ -27,6 +29,19 @@ def is_login_rate_limited(remote_addr: str) -> bool:
     )
 
 
+def is_username_rate_limited(username: str) -> bool:
+    # Empty usernames aren't bucketed — every anonymous probe would share
+    # one bucket and DoS the empty-username 401 path for everyone.
+    if not username:
+        return False
+    return check_rate_limit(
+        LOGIN_ATTEMPTS_BY_USERNAME,
+        username,
+        window=LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_SECONDS,
+        max_attempts=LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT_MAX_ATTEMPTS,
+    )
+
+
 @bp.get("/login")
 def login_form() -> str:
     next_target = request.args.get("next", "")
@@ -41,6 +56,8 @@ def login() -> Response:
 
     username = request.form.get("username", "").strip()
     password = request.form.get("password", "")
+    if is_username_rate_limited(username):
+        return Response("too many login attempts", status=429)
     with session_scope() as db:
         user = db.scalar(select(User).where(User.username == username))
         digest = user.password_digest if user is not None else _TIMING_DUMMY_DIGEST
@@ -51,6 +68,7 @@ def login() -> Response:
             return Response("invalid credentials", status=401)
         login_user(user.id, user.password_changed_at, user.admin)
         LOGIN_ATTEMPTS_BY_IP.pop(remote_addr, None)
+        LOGIN_ATTEMPTS_BY_USERNAME.pop(username, None)
     next_target = request.form.get("next", "")
     return redirect(next_target if is_safe_next(next_target) else "/dashboard")
 
diff --git a/l4d2web/tests/test_security.py b/l4d2web/tests/test_security.py
index 31d2323..7e1cdc4 100644
--- a/l4d2web/tests/test_security.py
+++ b/l4d2web/tests/test_security.py
@@ -30,6 +30,45 @@ def test_login_rate_limit(client) -> None:
     assert response.status_code == 429
 
 
+def test_login_rate_limit_per_username_across_ips(client) -> None:
+    """A distributed brute-force that rotates the source IP must still be
+    slowed once the per-username budget for a single account is exhausted."""
+    for i in range(20):
+        client.post(
+            "/login",
+            data={"username": "alice", "password": "wrong"},
+            environ_overrides={"REMOTE_ADDR": f"10.0.0.{i}"},
+        )
+
+    response = client.post(
+        "/login",
+        data={"username": "alice", "password": "wrong"},
+        environ_overrides={"REMOTE_ADDR": "10.99.99.99"},
+    )
+    assert response.status_code == 429
+
+
+def test_login_rate_limit_empty_username_does_not_bucket(client) -> None:
+    """Anonymous probes with no username must not all share one bucket — that
+    would let an attacker DoS legitimate empty-username 401s. We just don't
+    track them per-username."""
+    for i in range(25):
+        client.post(
+            "/login",
+            data={"username": "", "password": "wrong"},
+            environ_overrides={"REMOTE_ADDR": f"10.1.0.{i}"},
+        )
+
+    # A real username from a fresh IP must still get through to the
+    # 401 path (i.e. not be 429ed by empty-username spillover).
+    response = client.post(
+        "/login",
+        data={"username": "alice", "password": "wrong"},
+        environ_overrides={"REMOTE_ADDR": "10.2.0.1"},
+    )
+    assert response.status_code == 401
+
+
 def test_security_headers_present(client) -> None:
     response = client.get("/login")
     assert response.headers.get("X-Content-Type-Options") == "nosniff"