A 20-attempts-per-60s budget keyed by IP doesn't slow a distributed brute force that rotates source IPs. Add a parallel per-username bucket with the same threshold so a single account can't burn through more than 20 failed logins/min regardless of where they come from. Empty usernames aren't bucketed (would DoS the anonymous 401 path). Successful login clears both buckets.
143 lines
5 KiB
Python
143 lines
5 KiB
Python
import pytest
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from l4d2web.app import create_app
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from l4d2web.auth import hash_password
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from l4d2web.db import init_db, session_scope
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from l4d2web.models import User
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@pytest.fixture
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def client(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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db_url = f"sqlite:///{tmp_path/'security.db'}"
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monkeypatch.setenv("DATABASE_URL", db_url)
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app = create_app({"TESTING": True, "DATABASE_URL": db_url, "SECRET_KEY": "test"})
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init_db()
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with session_scope() as session:
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session.add(User(username="alice", password_digest=hash_password("secret"), admin=False))
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return app.test_client()
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def test_csrf_required(client) -> None:
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response = client.post("/servers", data={"name": "x"})
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assert response.status_code == 400
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def test_login_rate_limit(client) -> None:
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for _ in range(20):
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client.post("/login", data={"username": "x", "password": "y"})
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response = client.post("/login", data={"username": "x", "password": "y"})
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assert response.status_code == 429
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def test_login_rate_limit_per_username_across_ips(client) -> None:
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"""A distributed brute-force that rotates the source IP must still be
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slowed once the per-username budget for a single account is exhausted."""
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for i in range(20):
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client.post(
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"/login",
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data={"username": "alice", "password": "wrong"},
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environ_overrides={"REMOTE_ADDR": f"10.0.0.{i}"},
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)
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response = client.post(
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"/login",
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data={"username": "alice", "password": "wrong"},
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environ_overrides={"REMOTE_ADDR": "10.99.99.99"},
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)
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assert response.status_code == 429
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def test_login_rate_limit_empty_username_does_not_bucket(client) -> None:
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"""Anonymous probes with no username must not all share one bucket — that
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would let an attacker DoS legitimate empty-username 401s. We just don't
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track them per-username."""
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for i in range(25):
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client.post(
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"/login",
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data={"username": "", "password": "wrong"},
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environ_overrides={"REMOTE_ADDR": f"10.1.0.{i}"},
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)
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# A real username from a fresh IP must still get through to the
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# 401 path (i.e. not be 429ed by empty-username spillover).
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response = client.post(
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"/login",
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data={"username": "alice", "password": "wrong"},
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environ_overrides={"REMOTE_ADDR": "10.2.0.1"},
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)
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assert response.status_code == 401
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def test_security_headers_present(client) -> None:
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response = client.get("/login")
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assert response.headers.get("X-Content-Type-Options") == "nosniff"
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assert response.headers.get("X-Frame-Options") == "DENY"
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assert response.headers.get("Referrer-Policy") == "strict-origin-when-cross-origin"
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csp = response.headers.get("Content-Security-Policy")
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assert csp is not None
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assert "default-src 'self'" in csp
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assert "frame-ancestors 'none'" in csp
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assert "form-action 'self'" in csp
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def test_csp_nonce_matches_inline_script(client) -> None:
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"""Pages that emit inline <script> blocks must tag them with the
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per-request CSP nonce, otherwise the browser blocks them."""
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import re
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with client.session_transaction() as sess:
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sess["csrf_token"] = "tok"
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# Log in so we can hit /servers.
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with session_scope() as db:
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from sqlalchemy import select
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alice = db.scalar(select(User).where(User.username == "alice"))
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alice_id = alice.id
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marker = alice.password_changed_at.isoformat()
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with client.session_transaction() as sess:
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sess["user_id"] = alice_id
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sess["pw_changed_at"] = marker
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sess["admin"] = False
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response = client.get("/servers?prefill_blueprint_id=1")
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csp = response.headers.get("Content-Security-Policy", "")
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nonce_match = re.search(r"'nonce-([^']+)'", csp)
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assert nonce_match, f"expected nonce in CSP, got: {csp}"
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nonce = nonce_match.group(1)
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body = response.get_data(as_text=True)
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if "<script>" in body:
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# An un-nonced inline script slipped through.
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pytest.fail("inline <script> without nonce attribute")
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if "prefill_blueprint_id" in body and "showModal" in body:
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assert f'nonce="{nonce}"' in body
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def test_404_response_is_generic(client) -> None:
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response = client.get("/this-route-does-not-exist")
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assert response.status_code == 404
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body = response.get_data(as_text=True)
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assert "Traceback" not in body
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assert "werkzeug" not in body.lower()
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def test_500_response_does_not_leak_traceback(tmp_path, monkeypatch) -> None:
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from l4d2web.app import create_app
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db_url = f"sqlite:///{tmp_path/'boom.db'}"
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monkeypatch.setenv("DATABASE_URL", db_url)
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boom_app = create_app({
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"TESTING": True,
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"DATABASE_URL": db_url,
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"SECRET_KEY": "test",
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"PROPAGATE_EXCEPTIONS": False,
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})
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@boom_app.route("/__boom__")
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def boom():
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raise RuntimeError("internal detail that must not leak")
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response = boom_app.test_client().get("/__boom__")
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assert response.status_code == 500
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body = response.get_data(as_text=True)
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assert "internal detail" not in body
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assert "Traceback" not in body
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