8e678b6765
Update the educational reference copies of left4me-server@.service and left4me-web.service to match the new hardening composition from the ckn-bw reactor (HARDENING_COMMON + HARDENING_SERVER / HARDENING_WEB). Per-directive comments explain each defense's purpose and the threat it addresses, so a cold reader of this repo can understand the threat model from the unit file alone. Top-of-file note in each reference points at the ckn-bw reactor as the live source; reference is hand-synced. gunicorn ExecStart in the web reference uses placeholder '--workers 4 --threads 4' values; live emission interpolates from metadata. This is the documented divergence between the reference and the deployed unit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
81 lines
2.9 KiB
Desktop File
81 lines
2.9 KiB
Desktop File
# left4me web application — system unit.
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#
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# This is the REFERENCE COPY of the deployed unit. The live source is
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# the systemd/units reactor at ~/Projekte/ckn-bw/bundles/left4me/metadata.py
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# (look for 'left4me-web.service'). Hardening directives live in
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# the HARDENING_WEB constant near the top of the same file.
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# This file is hand-synced; edit both together.
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#
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# Several directives that the gameserver uses are intentionally absent
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# from this unit:
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# NoNewPrivileges — blocks sudo's setuid escalation
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# PrivateUsers — breaks sudo's host-root mapping
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# RestrictSUIDSGID — blocks setuid()/setgid()
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# CapabilityBoundingSet= — empty value would deny sudo's caps
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# ~@privileged in SystemCallFilter — blocks sudo's setuid syscall
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# The web app invokes privileged helpers (left4me-systemctl,
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# left4me-overlay, left4me-script-sandbox) via sudo, so these
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# directives can't be applied here. A future refactor replacing sudo
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# with systemctl-managed transient units would unlock them.
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#
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# Threat model + defenses + tests: see docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-15-hardening-*
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[Unit]
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Description=left4me web application
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After=network-online.target
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Wants=network-online.target
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[Service]
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Type=simple
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User=left4me
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Group=left4me
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WorkingDirectory=/opt/left4me/src
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Environment=HOME=/var/lib/left4me PATH=/opt/left4me/.venv/bin:/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin
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EnvironmentFile=/etc/left4me/host.env
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EnvironmentFile=/etc/left4me/web.env
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# Placeholder values for --workers / --threads. Live emission interpolates
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# from metadata.get('left4me/gunicorn_workers') and gunicorn_threads.
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ExecStart=/opt/left4me/.venv/bin/gunicorn --workers 4 --threads 4 --bind 127.0.0.1:8000 'l4d2web.app:create_app()'
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Restart=on-failure
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RestartSec=3
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# Web writes broadly under /var/lib/left4me (DB, instance configs,
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# overlays, runtime). Kept inline because it's web-specific
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# (server@ uses BindPaths to bind only its instance dir).
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ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/left4me
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# === Filesystem ===
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ProtectSystem=strict # tightened from prior 'full'; via HARDENING_COMMON
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ProtectHome=true
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PrivateTmp=true
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# === /proc + kernel ===
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ProtectProc=invisible # foreign-uid /proc hidden (defense: D4)
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ProcSubset=pid
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ProtectKernelTunables=true
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ProtectKernelModules=true
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ProtectKernelLogs=true
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ProtectClock=true
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ProtectControlGroups=true
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ProtectHostname=true
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LockPersonality=true
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# === Syscall filter (sudo-compatible — note absence of ~@privileged) ===
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SystemCallArchitectures=native
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SystemCallFilter=@system-service
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SystemCallFilter=~@debug @mount @raw-io @reboot @swap @cpu-emulation @obsolete
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# ~@debug blocks ptrace + process_vm_readv/writev (D4).
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# ~@privileged intentionally omitted — sudo needs setuid().
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# === Network ===
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RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_INET AF_INET6 AF_UNIX
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# === Misc hygiene ===
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RestrictNamespaces=true
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RestrictRealtime=true
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RemoveIPC=true
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KeyringMode=private
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UMask=0027
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[Install]
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WantedBy=multi-user.target
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