bundles/left4me: add HARDENING_{COMMON,SERVER,WEB} constants

Three shared dicts capturing the proven hardening composition from the
left4me hardening test plan (left4me commit 461b8d0). HARDENING_COMMON
is the directive set both managed units take verbatim; HARDENING_SERVER
adds the sudo-incompatible flags + filesystem virtualization + i386
amendment + PrivatePIDs + SocketBindAllow; HARDENING_WEB adds the
sudo-compatible syscall filter.

Not yet spread into the unit emission — that's the next commit.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
CroneKorkN 2026-05-15 14:42:26 +02:00
parent 91b7265136
commit 85b9af0aaa
Signed by: cronekorkn
SSH key fingerprint: SHA256:v0410ZKfuO1QHdgKBsdQNF64xmTxOF8osF1LIqwTcVw

View file

@ -108,6 +108,97 @@ defaults = {
} }
# Hardening composition — proven via the hardening test plan (left4me
# commit 461b8d0). See:
# docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-15-hardening-threat-model.md
# docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-15-hardening-defenses-survey.md
# docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-15-hardening-test-plan.md
# docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-15-hardening-refactor-design.md
# (paths in the left4me repo)
# Directives both managed units take verbatim.
HARDENING_COMMON = {
'ProtectProc': 'invisible',
'ProcSubset': 'pid',
'ProtectKernelTunables': 'true',
'ProtectKernelModules': 'true',
'ProtectKernelLogs': 'true',
'ProtectClock': 'true',
'ProtectControlGroups': 'true',
'ProtectHostname': 'true',
'LockPersonality': 'true',
'ProtectSystem': 'strict',
'ProtectHome': 'true',
'PrivateTmp': 'true',
'RestrictNamespaces': 'true',
'RestrictRealtime': 'true',
'RemoveIPC': 'true',
'KeyringMode': 'private',
'UMask': '0027',
'RestrictAddressFamilies': 'AF_INET AF_INET6 AF_UNIX',
}
# Gameserver unit: COMMON + sudo-incompatible flags + filesystem
# virtualization + i386 amendment + per-instance PID namespace + bound
# socket binds.
HARDENING_SERVER = {
**HARDENING_COMMON,
'NoNewPrivileges': 'true',
'RestrictSUIDSGID': 'true',
'PrivateUsers': 'true',
# PrivatePIDs is the test-plan amendment that closes D2.b: same-uid
# ProtectProc=invisible cannot hide gunicorn from srcds (both run
# as uid 980); a private PID namespace does.
'PrivatePIDs': 'true',
'PrivateIPC': 'true',
'PrivateDevices': 'true',
'CapabilityBoundingSet': '',
'AmbientCapabilities': '',
# srcds_linux is i386 (Source 2007 engine). Bare 'native' kills
# every 32-bit syscall and traps srcds_run in a respawn loop.
'SystemCallArchitectures': 'native x86',
'SystemCallFilter': (
'@system-service',
'~@debug @mount @raw-io @reboot @swap @cpu-emulation @obsolete @privileged',
),
'TemporaryFileSystem': '/var/lib /etc /opt /home /root /srv /mnt /media',
'BindReadOnlyPaths': (
'/var/lib/left4me/installation',
'/var/lib/left4me/overlays',
'/etc/left4me/host.env',
'/etc/ssl',
'/etc/ca-certificates',
'/etc/resolv.conf',
'/etc/nsswitch.conf',
'/etc/alternatives',
),
'BindPaths': '/var/lib/left4me/runtime/%i',
# Lock srcds bindable sockets to the game port range. Hard-coded
# range because systemd directive variable substitution is uneven.
'SocketBindAllow': (
'udp:27000-27999',
'tcp:27000-27999',
),
# MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true permanently excluded — Source engine
# i386 .so files have text relocations that need mprotect(W+X)
# during the dynamic linker's relocation pass.
}
# Web unit: COMMON + sudo-compatible additions. EXCLUDES
# NoNewPrivileges, PrivateUsers, RestrictSUIDSGID, empty
# CapabilityBoundingSet, and ~@privileged in the syscall filter — all
# sudo-incompatible until a future refactor replaces sudo with
# systemctl-managed transient units.
HARDENING_WEB = {
**HARDENING_COMMON,
'SystemCallArchitectures': 'native',
'SystemCallFilter': (
'@system-service',
'~@debug @mount @raw-io @reboot @swap @cpu-emulation @obsolete',
),
}
@metadata_reactor.provides( @metadata_reactor.provides(
'nginx/vhosts', 'nginx/vhosts',
) )