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6 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
130b0b1c9c
bundles/left4me: ship kernel.yama.ptrace_scope=2 sysctl drop-in
Belt-and-braces with the gameserver unit's SystemCallFilter=~@debug +
PrivateUsers=true. Currently applied by hand on left4.me (left over
from the hardening test plan's Test 9); landing in the bundle so it
survives bw apply and is reproducible on any future host.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-15 14:51:26 +02:00
c6721e7545
bundles/left4me: spread HARDENING_WEB into left4me-web.service
Adds the sudo-compatible hardening subset to the web unit. Tightens
ProtectSystem=full → strict. NoNewPrivileges, PrivateUsers,
RestrictSUIDSGID, empty CapabilityBoundingSet, and ~@privileged in the
syscall filter intentionally absent (sudo-incompatible until a future
refactor replaces the helper sudo with systemctl-managed transient
units).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-15 14:49:10 +02:00
640461c87a
bundles/left4me: spread HARDENING_SERVER into left4me-server@.service
Replaces the inline hardening directives on the gameserver unit with
the shared HARDENING_SERVER dict. Removes legacy ReadOnlyPaths /
ReadWritePaths (superseded by TemporaryFileSystem + BindReadOnlyPaths
+ BindPaths in the dict). Brings the unit to the proven Test 7
composition with the i386 amendment (SystemCallArchitectures=native x86)
and PrivatePIDs=true.

Not deployed until bw apply.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-15 14:46:58 +02:00
85b9af0aaa
bundles/left4me: add HARDENING_{COMMON,SERVER,WEB} constants
Three shared dicts capturing the proven hardening composition from the
left4me hardening test plan (left4me commit 461b8d0). HARDENING_COMMON
is the directive set both managed units take verbatim; HARDENING_SERVER
adds the sudo-incompatible flags + filesystem virtualization + i386
amendment + PrivatePIDs + SocketBindAllow; HARDENING_WEB adds the
sudo-compatible syscall filter.

Not yet spread into the unit emission — that's the next commit.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-15 14:42:26 +02:00
91b7265136
left4me: install_left4me_scripts reads from scripts/{libexec,sbin}/
left4me moved its privileged helpers out of deploy/files/usr/local/
into top-level scripts/{libexec,sbin}/ (left4me commit 5284e28).
deploy/ is now a reference exemplar, not source-of-truth; the helpers
are application-inherent code that lives where the rest of the
application does.

Repoint install_left4me_scripts at the new source paths under
/opt/left4me/src/scripts/{libexec,sbin}/. Install targets unchanged
(/usr/local/{libexec,sbin}/ on the host), so the apply is a no-op
diff on the deployed file content — only the source-of-install path
moves. Verified green by `bw apply ovh.left4me` against the test
server.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-15 12:08:36 +02:00
3ccaa919ee
left4me: install privileged scripts from git_deploy artifact
Replaces five verbatim file copies (four libexec helpers + the sbin
admin CLI) with a single triggered install action that copies them
from /opt/left4me/src/deploy/files/usr/local/{libexec,sbin}/ after
git_deploy. left4me's repo is now the only source of truth for the
script content; editing the helper here required a separate commit-
and-sync step that masked yesterday's idmap helper update on the
deployed server.

The new action ships everything under deploy/files/usr/local/libexec/
left4me/ to /usr/local/libexec/left4me/, which incidentally includes
the dead-code left4me-apply-cake. Harmless (nothing references it);
the cake migration cleanup can sweep it later.
2026-05-15 00:46:31 +02:00
7 changed files with 153 additions and 485 deletions

View file

@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/sh
set -eu
usage() {
printf '%s\n' "usage: left4me-journalctl <server-name> --lines <n> --follow|--no-follow" >&2
exit 2
}
validate_name() {
name=$1
[ -n "$name" ] || usage
case "$name" in
.*|*..*|*/*|*\\*) usage ;;
esac
case "$name" in
*[!A-Za-z0-9_.-]*) usage ;;
esac
}
[ "$#" -eq 4 ] || usage
name=$1
lines_flag=$2
lines=$3
follow_flag=$4
validate_name "$name"
[ "$lines_flag" = "--lines" ] || usage
case "$lines" in
''|*[!0-9]*) usage ;;
esac
follow_arg=
case "$follow_flag" in
--follow) follow_arg=-f ;;
--no-follow) ;;
*) usage ;;
esac
unit="left4me-server@${name}.service"
if [ -x /bin/journalctl ]; then
journalctl=/bin/journalctl
elif [ -x /usr/bin/journalctl ]; then
journalctl=/usr/bin/journalctl
else
printf '%s\n' 'journalctl not found at /bin/journalctl or /usr/bin/journalctl' >&2
exit 69
fi
if [ -n "$follow_arg" ]; then
exec "$journalctl" -u "$unit" -n "$lines" -o cat "$follow_arg"
fi
exec "$journalctl" -u "$unit" -n "$lines" -o cat

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@ -1,242 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/python3
"""Privileged overlay mount helper for left4me.
Invoked from the systemd unit's ExecStartPre / ExecStopPost via
`+/usr/bin/nsenter --mount=/proc/1/ns/mnt -- …`. The unit-level
nsenter is what makes this work: it runs the helper Python interpreter
inside PID 1's mount namespace. Without it, the `+` Exec prefix
removes the sandbox/credentials but does NOT detach from the unit's
per-service mount namespace, and the helper process itself would pin
that namespace alive — turning every umount into a multi-second EBUSY
race with the kernel's deferred namespace cleanup. With the unit-level
nsenter the helper has no such reference and umount succeeds first try.
Validates inputs strictly, then performs `mount -t overlay` /
`umount` directly — no internal nsenter, since the helper is already
running where the syscalls need to take effect.
Verbs:
mount <name> Reads ${LEFT4ME_ROOT}/instances/<name>/instance.env
for L4D2_LOWERDIRS, validates every lowerdir is
under one of installation/overlays/workshop_cache/
global_overlay_cache, then mounts the kernel
overlay at runtime/<name>/merged.
umount <name> Unmounts runtime/<name>/merged and cleans up the
kernel-overlayfs `work/work` orphan.
Set LEFT4ME_OVERLAY_PRINT_ONLY=1 to print the would-be argv (one line,
shell-quoted) and exit 0 instead of execv. Used by tests.
"""
import os
import re
import shlex
import shutil
import subprocess
import sys
from pathlib import Path
NAME_RE = re.compile(r"^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9_-]{0,63}$")
DEFAULT_ROOT = "/var/lib/left4me"
LOWERDIR_ALLOWLIST = (
"installation",
"overlays",
"global_overlay_cache",
"workshop_cache",
)
MAX_LOWERDIRS = 500
MOUNT_BIN = "/bin/mount"
UMOUNT_BIN = "/bin/umount"
def die(msg: str) -> None:
sys.stderr.write(f"left4me-overlay: {msg}\n")
sys.exit(1)
def root() -> Path:
return Path(os.environ.get("LEFT4ME_ROOT") or DEFAULT_ROOT)
def validate_name(name: str) -> str:
if not NAME_RE.fullmatch(name):
die(f"invalid instance name: {name!r}")
return name
def parse_lowerdirs(env_path: Path) -> list[str]:
if not env_path.is_file():
die(f"instance.env not found: {env_path}")
raw = None
for line in env_path.read_text().splitlines():
if "=" not in line:
continue
key, value = line.split("=", 1)
if key.strip() == "L4D2_LOWERDIRS":
raw = value
break
if raw is None:
die(f"L4D2_LOWERDIRS not set in {env_path}")
if raw == "":
die(f"L4D2_LOWERDIRS is empty in {env_path}")
parts = raw.split(":")
if any(p == "" for p in parts):
die(f"L4D2_LOWERDIRS contains an empty entry: {raw!r}")
if len(parts) > MAX_LOWERDIRS:
die(f"L4D2_LOWERDIRS has {len(parts)} entries (cap {MAX_LOWERDIRS})")
return parts
def canonical_under(allowed_roots: list[Path], path: Path) -> Path:
try:
canonical = path.resolve(strict=True)
except (FileNotFoundError, RuntimeError):
die(f"path does not exist or has a symlink loop: {path}")
for r in allowed_roots:
if canonical == r or r in canonical.parents:
return canonical
die(f"path is outside the permitted roots: {path} (resolved: {canonical})")
_LISTXATTR = getattr(os, "listxattr", None)
def _entry_has_fuse_xattr(path: str) -> str | None:
if _LISTXATTR is None:
return None
try:
attrs = _LISTXATTR(path, follow_symlinks=False)
except OSError:
return None
for a in attrs:
if a.startswith("user.fuseoverlayfs."):
return a
return None
def assert_no_fuse_xattrs(upper: Path) -> None:
if not upper.exists() or _LISTXATTR is None:
return
for dirpath, dirnames, filenames in os.walk(upper):
for entry in (dirpath, *(os.path.join(dirpath, n) for n in dirnames),
*(os.path.join(dirpath, n) for n in filenames)):
tainted = _entry_has_fuse_xattr(entry)
if tainted:
die(
f"upperdir contains fuse-overlayfs xattr {tainted!r} on {entry}; "
"wipe upper/ and work/ before mounting"
)
def exec_or_print(argv: list[str]) -> None:
if os.environ.get("LEFT4ME_OVERLAY_PRINT_ONLY") == "1":
print(" ".join(shlex.quote(a) for a in argv))
sys.exit(0)
os.execv(argv[0], argv)
def cmd_mount(name: str) -> None:
name = validate_name(name)
r = root()
runtime_name_dir = (r / "runtime" / name).resolve(strict=True)
merged_for_check = (runtime_name_dir / "merged").resolve(strict=True)
# Idempotency for unit restart cycles: if a previous start mounted
# successfully but ExecStart failed afterwards (and Restart=on-failure
# fires another cycle), the second ExecStartPre would otherwise refuse
# to mount-on-top. Short-circuit here so the second cycle just gets
# straight to ExecStart. PRINT_ONLY (test mode) bypasses this so the
# tests can exercise the full nsenter argv regardless of mount state.
if (
os.environ.get("LEFT4ME_OVERLAY_PRINT_ONLY") != "1"
and os.path.ismount(merged_for_check)
):
return
instance_env = r / "instances" / name / "instance.env"
raw_lowerdirs = parse_lowerdirs(instance_env)
allowed_roots = [(r / sub).resolve() for sub in LOWERDIR_ALLOWLIST]
canonical_lowerdirs = [str(canonical_under(allowed_roots, Path(p))) for p in raw_lowerdirs]
upper = (runtime_name_dir / "upper").resolve(strict=True)
work = (runtime_name_dir / "work").resolve(strict=True)
merged = merged_for_check
for label, path in (("upper", upper), ("work", work), ("merged", merged)):
if path.parent != runtime_name_dir:
die(f"{label} resolved outside runtime/{name}: {path}")
assert_no_fuse_xattrs(upper)
options = f"lowerdir={':'.join(canonical_lowerdirs)},upperdir={upper},workdir={work}"
argv = [
MOUNT_BIN,
"-t", "overlay",
"overlay",
"-o", options,
str(merged),
]
exec_or_print(argv)
def cmd_umount(name: str) -> None:
name = validate_name(name)
r = root()
runtime_name_dir = (r / "runtime" / name).resolve(strict=True)
merged_path = runtime_name_dir / "merged"
work_inner = runtime_name_dir / "work" / "work"
argv = [
UMOUNT_BIN,
# Resolve only if it exists; PRINT_ONLY tests always pre-create it.
str(merged_path.resolve(strict=True) if merged_path.exists() else merged_path),
]
# PRINT_ONLY: emit the umount argv and exit. Tests assert exact shape
# of this dry-run; the post-umount cleanup of work_inner is a runtime
# behaviour exercised on the host, not in unit tests.
if os.environ.get("LEFT4ME_OVERLAY_PRINT_ONLY") == "1":
print(" ".join(shlex.quote(a) for a in argv))
sys.exit(0)
if merged_path.exists():
merged = merged_path.resolve(strict=True)
if merged.parent != runtime_name_dir:
die(f"merged resolved outside runtime/{name}: {merged}")
# Idempotency: only umount if currently a mount point. Mirrors
# cmd_mount's symmetric check; a redundant cleanup pass — or a
# call after a partial _purge_instance — must be a no-op.
#
# No retry loop here: with the helper running in PID 1's mount
# namespace (via the unit-level `nsenter --mount=/proc/1/ns/mnt`
# in ExecStopPost), it holds no reference to the unit's
# per-service mount namespace, so the cgroup-empty → namespace
# reaped → umount-clears sequence happens without any race
# window for us to ride out. EBUSY here is a real error.
if os.path.ismount(merged):
subprocess.run(argv, check=True)
# Kernel-overlayfs creates work_inner during mount with root:root mode
# 0/0. After unmount it's an orphan that the unit's User= (left4me)
# cannot traverse via shutil.rmtree, so reset/delete in instances.py
# blows up with EACCES on `runtime/<name>/work/work`. The helper is
# the only code path with root that knows about this directory, so
# the cleanup belongs here. Safe to nuke — the kernel re-creates it
# on the next mount. Run unconditionally — covers both "we just
# unmounted" and "previous teardown didn't finish" cases.
if work_inner.exists():
shutil.rmtree(work_inner)
def main(argv: list[str]) -> None:
if len(argv) != 3 or argv[1] not in ("mount", "umount"):
sys.stderr.write("usage: left4me-overlay mount|umount <name>\n")
sys.exit(2)
if argv[1] == "mount":
cmd_mount(argv[2])
else:
cmd_umount(argv[2])
if __name__ == "__main__":
main(sys.argv)

View file

@ -1,82 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/bash
# Privileged sandbox launcher for left4me script overlays.
#
# Invoked via sudo by the web user with two arguments:
# <overlay_id> numeric overlay id; bind-mounts /var/lib/left4me/overlays/<id>
# read-write at /overlay inside the sandbox.
# <script_path> absolute path to a bash file already written by the web app;
# bind-mounted read-only at /script.sh inside the sandbox.
#
# The script runs as a transient systemd .service with the full hardening
# surface: cgroup limits + walltime kill, NoNewPrivileges, ProtectSystem,
# ProtectHome, kernel-tunable / -module / -log protection, namespace
# restriction, address-family restriction, capability bounding (empty),
# seccomp filter (@system-service @network-io), MemoryDenyWriteExecute,
# LockPersonality, RestrictSUIDSGID. Network namespace is *not* restricted —
# scripts must reach the public internet to download workshop / l4d2center
# / cedapug content. PID namespace is shared with the host (no
# PrivatePID= directive in systemd); host PIDs are visible via /proc but
# not signal-able due to UID mismatch.
set -euo pipefail
[[ $# -eq 2 ]] || { echo "usage: $0 <overlay_id> <script>" >&2; exit 64; }
OVERLAY_ID=$1
SCRIPT=$2
[[ "$OVERLAY_ID" =~ ^[0-9]+$ ]] || { echo "bad overlay id" >&2; exit 64; }
OVERLAY_DIR=/var/lib/left4me/overlays/$OVERLAY_ID
[[ -d $OVERLAY_DIR ]] || { echo "no overlay dir at $OVERLAY_DIR" >&2; exit 65; }
[[ -f $SCRIPT ]] || { echo "no script at $SCRIPT" >&2; exit 65; }
if [[ "${LEFT4ME_SCRIPT_SANDBOX_DRY_RUN:-}" == "1" ]]; then
echo "DRY RUN: overlay_id=$OVERLAY_ID script=$SCRIPT overlay_dir=$OVERLAY_DIR"
exit 0
fi
# Make sure the sandbox UID owns the overlay dir so the script can write there.
# Idempotent: a no-op when the dir is already l4d2-sandbox-owned (re-run case),
# and corrects the ownership the first time the dir was created by the web app
# under the left4me UID. World-readable so the gameserver process (left4me)
# can read the overlay contents via the kernel-overlayfs lowerdir at runtime.
chown -R l4d2-sandbox:l4d2-sandbox "$OVERLAY_DIR"
chmod 0755 "$OVERLAY_DIR"
SCRIPT_RC=0
systemd-run --quiet --collect --wait --pipe \
--unit="left4me-script-${OVERLAY_ID}-$$" \
--slice=l4d2-build.slice \
-p OOMScoreAdjust=500 \
-p User=l4d2-sandbox -p Group=l4d2-sandbox \
-p UMask=0022 \
-p NoNewPrivileges=yes \
-p ProtectSystem=strict -p ProtectHome=yes \
-p PrivateTmp=yes -p PrivateDevices=yes -p PrivateIPC=yes \
-p ProtectKernelTunables=yes -p ProtectKernelModules=yes \
-p ProtectKernelLogs=yes -p ProtectControlGroups=yes \
-p RestrictNamespaces=yes \
-p RestrictAddressFamilies="AF_INET AF_INET6 AF_UNIX" \
-p RestrictSUIDSGID=yes -p LockPersonality=yes \
-p MemoryDenyWriteExecute=yes \
-p SystemCallFilter="@system-service @network-io" \
-p SystemCallArchitectures=native \
-p CapabilityBoundingSet= -p AmbientCapabilities= \
-p IPAddressDeny="127.0.0.0/8 ::1/128 169.254.0.0/16 fe80::/10 224.0.0.0/4 ff00::/8 10.0.0.0/8 172.16.0.0/12 192.168.0.0/16 100.64.0.0/10 fc00::/7" \
-p TemporaryFileSystem="/etc /var/lib" \
-p BindReadOnlyPaths="/etc/left4me/sandbox-resolv.conf:/etc/resolv.conf /etc/ssl /etc/ca-certificates /etc/nsswitch.conf /etc/alternatives ${SCRIPT}:/script.sh" \
-p BindPaths="${OVERLAY_DIR}:/overlay" \
-p WorkingDirectory=/overlay \
-p Environment="HOME=/tmp PATH=/usr/bin:/usr/sbin OVERLAY=/overlay" \
-p MemoryMax=4G -p MemorySwapMax=0 -p TasksMax=512 \
-p CPUQuota=200% -p RuntimeMaxSec=3600 \
-- /bin/bash /script.sh || SCRIPT_RC=$?
# Normalize perms so the web service (left4me uid) can read overlay files
# directly via Python open() — needed by the file tree's download endpoint.
# UMask=0022 above takes care of *new* writes; this catches anything the
# script created with a tighter mode (e.g. cedapug_maps writes its
# .cedapug/manifest.tsv as 0600 by default).
find "$OVERLAY_DIR" -type f ! -perm -o+r -exec chmod o+r {} + 2>/dev/null || true
find "$OVERLAY_DIR" -type d ! -perm -o+rx -exec chmod o+rx {} + 2>/dev/null || true
exit $SCRIPT_RC

View file

@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/sh
set -eu
usage() {
printf '%s\n' "usage: left4me-systemctl enable|disable|show <server-name>" >&2
exit 2
}
validate_name() {
name=$1
[ -n "$name" ] || usage
case "$name" in
.*|*..*|*/*|*\\*) usage ;;
esac
case "$name" in
*[!A-Za-z0-9_.-]*) usage ;;
esac
}
[ "$#" -eq 2 ] || usage
action=$1
name=$2
case "$action" in
enable|disable|show) ;;
*) usage ;;
esac
validate_name "$name"
unit="left4me-server@${name}.service"
if [ -x /bin/systemctl ]; then
systemctl=/bin/systemctl
elif [ -x /usr/bin/systemctl ]; then
systemctl=/usr/bin/systemctl
else
printf '%s\n' 'systemctl not found at /bin/systemctl or /usr/bin/systemctl' >&2
exit 69
fi
case "$action" in
enable) exec "$systemctl" enable --now "$unit" ;;
disable) exec "$systemctl" disable --now "$unit" ;;
show) exec "$systemctl" show --property=ActiveState --property=SubState "$unit" ;;
esac

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@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/sh
# Run l4d2web flask CLI commands as the left4me user with the deploy env loaded.
# Usage: left4me <flask-subcommand> [args...]
# Examples:
# left4me create-user alice --admin
# left4me seed-script-overlays /opt/left4me/src/examples/script-overlays
# left4me routes
set -eu
exec sudo -u left4me sh -c '
set -a
. /etc/left4me/host.env
. /etc/left4me/web.env
set +a
export JOB_WORKER_ENABLED=false
export PYTHONPATH=/opt/left4me/src
exec /opt/left4me/.venv/bin/flask --app l4d2web.app:create_app "$@"
' sh "$@"

View file

@ -61,31 +61,13 @@ users = {
# policy) so file ownership is deterministic across rebuilds and
# backup restores. 980/981 are unused elsewhere in this repo.
# Privileged helpers (mode 0755 root:root). Listed by sudoers as the only
# commands left4me can invoke as root NOPASSWD.
HELPERS = (
'left4me-systemctl',
'left4me-journalctl',
'left4me-overlay',
'left4me-script-sandbox',
)
# Privileged helpers are installed by the `install_left4me_scripts`
# action (below) directly from the left4me git checkout at
# `/opt/left4me/src/scripts/{libexec,sbin}/` — no verbatim copy in this
# bundle's files/ tree. Sudoers (further below) lists the specific
# paths that left4me may invoke as root NOPASSWD.
files = {
'/usr/local/sbin/left4me': {
'source': 'usr/local/sbin/left4me', # explicit — basename collides with sudoers
'mode': '0755',
'owner': 'root',
'group': 'root',
},
**{
f'/usr/local/libexec/left4me/{h}': {
'source': f'usr/local/libexec/left4me/{h}',
'mode': '0755',
'owner': 'root',
'group': 'root',
}
for h in HELPERS
},
'/etc/left4me/sandbox-resolv.conf': {
'source': 'etc/left4me/sandbox-resolv.conf',
'mode': '0644',
@ -190,6 +172,10 @@ git_deploy = {
# update; the seed_overlays + service:restart cascade off
# alembic also covers picking up the new code in gunicorn.
'action:left4me_alembic_upgrade',
# Privileged-helper scripts: reinstall from the new checkout
# into /usr/local/{libexec,sbin}/ as root-owned. No-op when
# the checkout didn't actually change (action is triggered).
'action:install_left4me_scripts',
],
# chown_src and pip_install are NOT in triggers — they run every
# apply gated by their own `unless` guards, which makes the chain
@ -198,6 +184,28 @@ git_deploy = {
},
}
actions['install_left4me_scripts'] = {
# Copy privileged scripts from the deployed left4me checkout into
# /usr/local/{libexec,sbin}/ as root:root 0755. Source of truth for
# the file content is left4me's scripts/{libexec,sbin}/ tree (these
# are application code, not deploy artifacts; left4me's deploy/ is
# reference material only). The two install globs map source dirs
# 1:1 to deploy targets. Triggered only on git_deploy updates so a
# no-op apply doesn't re-copy.
'command': (
'install -m 0755 -o root -g root -t /usr/local/libexec/left4me/ '
'/opt/left4me/src/scripts/libexec/*; '
'install -m 0755 -o root -g root -t /usr/local/sbin/ '
'/opt/left4me/src/scripts/sbin/*'
),
'triggered': True,
'cascade_skip': False,
'needs': [
'git_deploy:/opt/left4me/src',
'directory:/usr/local/libexec/left4me',
],
}
actions['left4me_chown_src'] = {
# Runs every apply (cheap — chown -R on a small tree). Self-heals
# whenever git_deploy extracts a new tarball as root-owned files.

View file

@ -83,6 +83,17 @@ defaults = {
'/etc/left4me',
},
},
'sysctl': {
# Block ptrace except from CAP_SYS_PTRACE holders. Belt-and-braces
# with SystemCallFilter=~@debug + PrivateUsers=true in the gameserver
# unit. See:
# left4me docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-15-hardening-defenses-survey.md
'kernel': {
'yama': {
'ptrace_scope': '2',
},
},
},
'systemd-timers': {
# Daily re-fetch of Steam Workshop metadata + .vpk downloads for any
# item whose author published an update. The CLI just inserts a
@ -108,6 +119,97 @@ defaults = {
}
# Hardening composition — proven via the hardening test plan (left4me
# commit 461b8d0). See:
# docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-15-hardening-threat-model.md
# docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-15-hardening-defenses-survey.md
# docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-15-hardening-test-plan.md
# docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-15-hardening-refactor-design.md
# (paths in the left4me repo)
# Directives both managed units take verbatim.
HARDENING_COMMON = {
'ProtectProc': 'invisible',
'ProcSubset': 'pid',
'ProtectKernelTunables': 'true',
'ProtectKernelModules': 'true',
'ProtectKernelLogs': 'true',
'ProtectClock': 'true',
'ProtectControlGroups': 'true',
'ProtectHostname': 'true',
'LockPersonality': 'true',
'ProtectSystem': 'strict',
'ProtectHome': 'true',
'PrivateTmp': 'true',
'RestrictNamespaces': 'true',
'RestrictRealtime': 'true',
'RemoveIPC': 'true',
'KeyringMode': 'private',
'UMask': '0027',
'RestrictAddressFamilies': 'AF_INET AF_INET6 AF_UNIX',
}
# Gameserver unit: COMMON + sudo-incompatible flags + filesystem
# virtualization + i386 amendment + per-instance PID namespace + bound
# socket binds.
HARDENING_SERVER = {
**HARDENING_COMMON,
'NoNewPrivileges': 'true',
'RestrictSUIDSGID': 'true',
'PrivateUsers': 'true',
# PrivatePIDs is the test-plan amendment that closes D2.b: same-uid
# ProtectProc=invisible cannot hide gunicorn from srcds (both run
# as uid 980); a private PID namespace does.
'PrivatePIDs': 'true',
'PrivateIPC': 'true',
'PrivateDevices': 'true',
'CapabilityBoundingSet': '',
'AmbientCapabilities': '',
# srcds_linux is i386 (Source 2007 engine). Bare 'native' kills
# every 32-bit syscall and traps srcds_run in a respawn loop.
'SystemCallArchitectures': 'native x86',
'SystemCallFilter': (
'@system-service',
'~@debug @mount @raw-io @reboot @swap @cpu-emulation @obsolete @privileged',
),
'TemporaryFileSystem': '/var/lib /etc /opt /home /root /srv /mnt /media',
'BindReadOnlyPaths': (
'/var/lib/left4me/installation',
'/var/lib/left4me/overlays',
'/etc/left4me/host.env',
'/etc/ssl',
'/etc/ca-certificates',
'/etc/resolv.conf',
'/etc/nsswitch.conf',
'/etc/alternatives',
),
'BindPaths': '/var/lib/left4me/runtime/%i',
# Lock srcds bindable sockets to the game port range. Hard-coded
# range because systemd directive variable substitution is uneven.
'SocketBindAllow': (
'udp:27000-27999',
'tcp:27000-27999',
),
# MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true permanently excluded — Source engine
# i386 .so files have text relocations that need mprotect(W+X)
# during the dynamic linker's relocation pass.
}
# Web unit: COMMON + sudo-compatible additions. EXCLUDES
# NoNewPrivileges, PrivateUsers, RestrictSUIDSGID, empty
# CapabilityBoundingSet, and ~@privileged in the syscall filter — all
# sudo-incompatible until a future refactor replaces sudo with
# systemctl-managed transient units.
HARDENING_WEB = {
**HARDENING_COMMON,
'SystemCallArchitectures': 'native',
'SystemCallFilter': (
'@system-service',
'~@debug @mount @raw-io @reboot @swap @cpu-emulation @obsolete',
),
}
@metadata_reactor.provides(
'nginx/vhosts',
)
@ -209,10 +311,18 @@ def systemd_units(metadata):
),
'Restart': 'on-failure',
'RestartSec': '3',
# NoNewPrivileges intentionally NOT set: workers sudo to the helpers.
'ProtectSystem': 'full',
# Web app writes broadly under /var/lib/left4me. Kept inline
# because it's web-specific (server@ uses BindPaths to bind
# only its instance dir).
'ReadWritePaths': '/var/lib/left4me',
'PrivateTmp': 'true',
# Hardening profile — see HARDENING_WEB constant near top of
# this file. NoNewPrivileges intentionally NOT set: workers
# sudo to the helpers. PrivateUsers and RestrictSUIDSGID also
# absent for the same reason. ProtectSystem tightens from
# 'full' to 'strict' via HARDENING_COMMON.
**HARDENING_WEB,
},
'Install': {
'WantedBy': {'multi-user.target'},
@ -235,20 +345,13 @@ def systemd_units(metadata):
'/var/lib/left4me/instances/%i/instance.env',
),
'WorkingDirectory': '-/var/lib/left4me/runtime/%i/merged/left4dead2',
'ExecStartPre': (
'+/usr/bin/nsenter --mount=/proc/1/ns/mnt -- '
'/usr/local/libexec/left4me/left4me-overlay mount %i'
),
'ExecStart': (
'/var/lib/left4me/runtime/%i/merged/srcds_run '
'-game left4dead2 +hostport ${L4D2_PORT} $L4D2_ARGS'
),
'ExecStopPost': (
'+/usr/bin/nsenter --mount=/proc/1/ns/mnt -- '
'/usr/local/libexec/left4me/left4me-overlay umount %i'
),
'ExecStartPre': '+/usr/bin/nsenter --mount=/proc/1/ns/mnt -- /usr/local/libexec/left4me/left4me-overlay mount %i',
'ExecStart': '/var/lib/left4me/runtime/%i/merged/srcds_run -game left4dead2 +hostport ${L4D2_PORT} $L4D2_ARGS',
'ExecStopPost': '+/usr/bin/nsenter --mount=/proc/1/ns/mnt -- /usr/local/libexec/left4me/left4me-overlay umount %i',
'Restart': 'on-failure',
'RestartSec': '5',
# Resource control (baseline from prior performance work).
'Slice': 'l4d2-game.slice',
'Nice': '-5',
'IOSchedulingClass': 'best-effort',
@ -261,15 +364,10 @@ def systemd_units(metadata):
'KillSignal': 'SIGINT',
'TimeoutStopSec': '15s',
'LogRateLimitIntervalSec': '0',
'NoNewPrivileges': 'true',
'PrivateTmp': 'true',
'PrivateDevices': 'true',
'ProtectHome': 'true',
'ProtectSystem': 'strict',
'ReadOnlyPaths': '/var/lib/left4me/installation /var/lib/left4me/overlays',
'ReadWritePaths': '/var/lib/left4me/runtime/%i',
'RestrictSUIDSGID': 'true',
'LockPersonality': 'true',
# Hardening profile — see HARDENING_SERVER constant near top of
# this file for per-directive rationale.
**HARDENING_SERVER,
},
'Install': {
'WantedBy': {'multi-user.target'},